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Abstract:  
This study examines the role of power relationship and coordination in sustainable supply 
chain management. We investigate a two-echelon supply chain that consists of a manufacturer 
and a retailer whose customer demand is carbon emission sensitive. Using the game-theoretic 
approach, we compare the equilibrium solutions under three supply chain power structures to 
analyse the effect of power relationship on supply chain decisions and sustainability 
performance. A two-part tariff contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain. The 
findings provide important managerial insights that can help firms develop a better 
understanding of power relationship and coordination in achieving sustainability goals. 
Keywords: Sustainable supply chain; power structure; supply chain coordination; game 
theory 
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1 Introduction  
In the era of climate change, firms are exerted increasing pressure to reduce carbon emissions 
while maintain their economic competitiveness. However, the notion of “boundaryless 
responsibility” (Amaeshi et al. 2008) means that firms need to consider how they can achieve 
economic, environmental, and social objectives of the sustainability throughout their entire 
supply chain. It is important for them to look beyond their organizational boundaries and 
develop a more holistic solution for a sustainable supply chain. Sustainable supply chain 
management would require efforts from all segments of the supply chain. However, there are 
often conflicting interests between individual supply chain members such as tension between a 
manufacturer and a retailer considered in this study. In the UK and France, we have witnessed 
some high profile protests against major supermarket chains by the dairy farmers because of 
cheap prices of milk. Despite Apple’s promise, published in annual Supplier Responsibility 
Report to improve working conditions and preserve the environment, some of the technology 
giant’s suppliers are on the news headlines being accused over worker exploitation. Moreover, 
the UK government requires firms to measure and to report their annual greenhouse gas 
emissions of their own operations, and furthermore, it is also anticipated that companies will be 
required to report carbon footprint of upstream supply chain activities that are beyond a 
reporting firm’s direct control.  
Sustainable supply chain management requires a coordinated effort from all parties to 
achieve the sustainability objectives. Such an effort may be hampered by the trade-offs 
between different sustainability objectives and tensions between supply chain members. 
Furthermore, the power relationship between supply chain partners makes the coordination of a 
sustainable supply chain even more complicated. Referring to resource-dependence perspective, 
power depends on the criticality of the commercial and operational resources and the 
availability of alternatives for souring the same resource (Cox et al., 2002; Touboulic et al. 
2014). Touboulic et al. (2014) shows the influences of power on how supply chain members 
manage their relationships and its effect of organizational response to the sustainability 
implementation. It is critical that power structures that exist in the supply chains are properly 
understood by managers in order to manage supply chains strategically and operationally (Cox 
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1999). Very little effort has been made in the existing literature to explore the issue of 
coordinating the sustainable supply chain with the consideration of power relationship. This 
study is going to fill this gap in the literature by addressing the following research questions: 
(1) Should the supply chain members work on sustainability initiatives independently or 
coordinate their sustainability effort? 
(2) If yes, how should members coordinate with each other to achieve economic and 
environmental competitiveness? 
(3) What is the impact of supply chain power relationship on the coordination decisions and 
sustainability performances?  
In order to answer these questions, a two-echelon supply chain is considered. It consists 
of a manufacturer and a retailer who purchases products from the manufacturer and sell them 
to end consumers. To take economic and environmental performances into consideration, the 
consumer demand faced by the retailer is assumed to be carbon emissions sensitive, as well as 
price sensitive. Based on game models, the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price and unit 
carbon emissions, and the retailer’s optimal retail price are derived under three different 
supply chain power structures, that is, the equilibria of the manufacturer Stackelberg, vertical 
Nash and retailer Stackelberg, respectively. Through a comparison of the derived results from 
three power structures, we analyse the effect of the supply chain power relationship on 
operations decisions, coordination contracts, and sustainability performances. The main 
contributions of our work are as follows: 
First, the notions of supply chain coordination (Simpson and Power 2005; Vachon and 
Klassen 2008; Swami and Shah 2013) and supply chain power relationship (Simpson et al. 
2007; Pagell et al. 2010; Touboulic et al. 2014) have been recognised to play important roles 
in sustainable supply chain management by the existing literature. Achieving the economic 
and environmental sustainability requires a coordinated effort from the involved supply chain 
members (Swami and Shah 2013), and such an effort may be hampered by the power 
relationship in supply chains (Touboulic et al. 2014). Nevertheless, few studies have been 
brought the two important issues together to systematically examine their impact on 
accomplishing the economic and environmental competitiveness. To the best of our 
knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to explore this research avenue. The research 
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findings derived from such an investigation will help firms seek optimal solutions based on 
their supply chain environments to improve the sustainability performances. 
Second, more and more firms view the carbon emission reduction as a competitive 
strategy to win customer demand because of the increasing customer environmental 
consciousness (Liu et al. 2012; Kanchanapibul et al. 2014; Zhang 2015). We consider a 
demand function that is both price and carbon emissions sensitive and use the carbon 
emission attribute as a decision variable rather than a constraint, which complements to the 
existing low carbon supply chain literature that often uses the carbon emissions attribute as a 
constraint or considers the demand of single manufacturer (Nouira et al. 2014; Du et al. 
2015).  
Third, this research also makes important practical and policy contributions. Through the 
systematic analysis of optimal wholesale prices, retail prices, unit carbon emissions, and tariff 
contracts under different supply chain power structures, our findings provide valuable 
managerial implications, which will be beneficial for firms to make important strategic and 
operational decisions in order to achieve economic and environmental competitiveness. 
Furthermore, from the policy makers’ perspective, our research findings provide interesting 
insights on how different supply chain power relationships affect firms’ decision and, as a 
result, the economic and environmental performances of the entire supply chain. It is valuable 
for policy makers to create a more sustainable supply chain environment that can promote low 
carbon economy. 
The remaining of this article is organised as follows. After a brief review of research 
background in Section 2, we present model assumptions and descriptions in Section 3. In 
Section 4, the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price and unit carbon emissions, and the 
retailer’s optimal retail price are obtained in the manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) model, the 
vertical Nash (VN) model, and the retailer Stackelberg (RS) model respectively. In Section 5, 
we focus on how to achieve channel coordination through a two-part tariff contract for the 
sustainable supply chain. In Section 6, we examine the effect of power relationship on the 
coordination decisions and sustainability performances of the supply chain. A case study is 
presented in Section 7, in which numerical examples are provided to give more management 
insights. Finally, we discuss the managerial implications of our study and possible future 
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work in Section 8. 
 
2 Research Background  
The literature reviewed in this article primarily relates to three research streams: (i) 
sustainable supply chain management, (ii) coordination in sustainable supply chain 
management, and (iii) the role of power in sustainable supply chain management. 
 
2.1 Sustainable supply chain management: an overview  
Sustainable development is defined as ‘a development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED 
1987). The concept of sustainability requires that a mix of social, economic and 
environmental factors should be incorporated into decisions on business development and 
resource allocation (Dyllick and Hockerts 2002; Gauthier 2005; Chiou et al. 2011; Yang et al. 
2013; Wan et al. 2015; Li and Li 2016). Applying this concept to the sustainable supply chain 
management domain, Seuring & Müller (2008) defined it as management of material, 
information and capital flows as well as cooperation among companies along the supply chain 
while taking goals from all three dimensions of sustainable development, i.e., economic, 
environmental and social, into account. Carter and Rogers (2008) used a conceptual theory 
building approach to incorporate relevant literature with complementary theories to introduce 
a theoretical framework of sustainable supply chain management. Similar to Seuring & 
Müller (2008), the core of their conceptualization is Elkington’s (1998) triple bottom line: the 
intersection of environmental, social, and economic performance. Furthermore, the focus of 
supply chain sustainability has emerged from local optimisation of environmental factors to 
consideration of whole life cycle of a supply chain including the production, consumption, 
customer service and post-disposal disposition of products (Linton et al. 2007). Despite many 
efforts have been made over the past decade to develop models and frameworks to assess 
supply chain sustainability, the techniques of sustainability performance measurement has not 
yet fully matured and very few have an integrative focus on measuring environmental, 
economic and social dimensions (Labuschagne et al. 2005; Bai and Sarkis 2010; Erol et al. 
2011; Zhu et al. 2011; Boukherroub et al. 2015; Chen and Wang 2016; Wang et al. 2016). A 
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recent comprehensive review of the literature investigating corporate sustainability 
development in China showed that the integration of the three dimensions of sustainability 
and decision-making methodology is still rare (Bai et al. 2015). Furthermore, sustainability is 
a dynamic rather than a static concept and perceptions of sustainability have changed 
significantly over the last decade associated with changing awareness, knowledge, technology, 
market preferences and government policy (Vasileiou and Morris 2006).  
 
2.2 Coordinating sustainable supply chains 
Channel coordination is an important issue in supply chain management. According to 
Jeuland and Shugan (1983), channel coordination is defined as the setting of all manufacturer 
and retailer related decisions at the levels that would maximize the total channel profits. 
Effective management of sustainable supply chain requires coordination among various 
channel members. Relevant studies on the coordination problem have been well reported in 
the literature (Ingene and Parry 1995; Weng 1995; Xu et al. 2001; Raju and Zhang 2005; Cai 
2010; Choi et al. 2013; Chen et al. 2014; Luo and Chen 2016), here we mainly focus on the 
literature concerning coordination in the context of sustainable supply chain management.  
Among the earlier studies, Walton et al. (1998) investigated how to integrate suppliers 
into the environmental management processes based on case studies of five companies in the 
furniture industry and their results show that it is beneficial for integrating suppliers into 
environmental management practices. Their view is also supported by Rao (2002) in the 
questionnaire survey of ISO 14001 certified companies in five South-East Asian countries. In 
their case study of a sustainable cotton supply chain at a German company, Goldbach et al. 
(2003) indicated that the major difficulty of making a conventional supply chain sustainable is 
how to coordinate the activities of a complicated network that involved different players. 
Simpson and Power (2005) also pointed that efforts to improve or influence supplier’s 
environmental management practices are critical to the buyer and it can be costly endeavour if 
it is not managed correctly. Vachon and Klassen (2006) examined the impact of upstream and 
downstream integration on extending green practices across the supply chain. Their finding 
shows that greater supply chain integration can benefit environment management in 
operations. Vachon and Klassen (2008) extended their earlier work by examining the role of 
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supply chain collaboration in environmental management and manufacturing performance. 
They found that the benefits of collaborative green practices with suppliers were broadest 
whereas collaboration with customers yielded mixed outcomes. In their survey of Australia 
automotive supply chain, Simpson et al. (2007) found that suppliers were more responsive to 
their customers' environmental performance requirements where increasing levels of 
relationship-specific investment occurred. Pagell and Wu (2009) stated that cooperation with 
suppliers has become an essential component of developing sustainable supply chains. More 
recently, Choi et al. (2013) explored the significance of channel leadership in closed loop 
supply chains (CLSC) by examining the influence of different channel leadership models on 
the optimal decisions and performance. In their research, practical and novel channel 
coordination schemes are developed for the CLSCs under various supply chain configurations. 
Swami and Shah (2013) studied the problem of coordination of a manufacturer and a retailer 
in a green supply chain. Some critical questions such as extent of effort in greening of 
operations by manufacturer or retailer, level of cooperation between the two parties, and how 
to coordinate their operations, are addressed in their research. Panda (2014) investigated the 
coordination of a manufacturer–retailer chain and the research found that corporate social 
responsible retailer’s perfect welfare maximizing motive resolves channel conflict and 
revenue sharing contract coordinates the channel. In both studies, the effect of the power 
dynamics between the manufacturer and the retailer on above questions was not considered. 
 
2.3 Effect of supply chain power relationship on sustainability   
One important stream of literature looks into the role of power, and imbalanced power in 
particular, in influencing sustainable supply chain practices. These studies mainly focus on the 
power relationships between manufacturers and their suppliers or between manufacturers and 
their customers, and the influences on sustainability practices. For instance, Pedersen and 
Andersen (2006) identified bargaining power as an important mechanism safeguarding codes 
of conduct. In their analysis of the US food industry, Pullman et al. (2009) provided the view 
that power imbalance is highly relevant to segments of the food supply chain and, as a result, 
affects the sharing of sustainability practice costs and resulting performance. More recently, 
Touboulic et al. (2014) studied how the influences of power affect organizational responses to 
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the implementation of sustainability initiatives and their findings show that power particularly 
affects the sharing of sustainability-related risks and value between supply chain partners.  
    Another relevant stream of literature examines the impact of supply chain power 
dynamics on operational decisions and performances in general using game theoretical 
approach (Chen et al. 2016). For example, Ertek and Griffin (2002) examined the effect of 
power structure on price, profits and sensitivity of the market price through analysing the case 
where the buyer has dominant bargaining power and the situation where the supplier has 
dominant bargaining power in a two-stage supply chain. Using the game theoretical approach, 
Cai et al. (2009) analysed the effect of price discounts and price schemes on the dual-channel 
supply chain competition under different power structures. Similarly, Zhang et al. (2012), 
from the game theoretical perspective, examined the effect of products’ substitutability and 
channel position on pricing decision under different power structures in two dual-exclusive 
channels. Their research findings indicated that the vertical Nash game is the equilibrium for 
the supply chain members and the balanced power structure always performs best for the 
whole supply chain. Using manufacturer and retailer Stackelberg games and Nash game, Shi 
et al. (2013) examined the impacts of different power structures on supply chains with 
random and price-dependent demand. Their study showed that power structure makes an 
impact on supply chain efficiency and the impact depends on both expected demand and 
demand shock. Gao et al. (2015) analysed the effect of various channel power structures on 
the optimal decisions and performance in a CLSC. Applying the game theoretic models, the 
research also explored the best channel power structure from the perspective of the supply 
chain and consumers. Chen and Wang (2015) systematically investigated the impact of 
different power structures on the decisions of pricing and channel selection between free and 
bundled channels in a mobile phone supply chain setting.  
   Although game theoretical approaches have been widely adopted to examine the effect of 
the supply chain power structure on firms’ operations decisions and their performances, as far 
as our understanding, few studies have systematically analysed the impact of power 
relationship on the coordination of sustainable supply chains and the sustainability 
performance. Our paper complements the exiting literature by specifically providing 
analytical models to study power relationship and channel coordination in a sustainable 
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supply chain environment. It will help develop a better understanding of the role of the supply 
chain power relationship in achieving sustainability goals.   
 
3 Model descriptions and assumption 
We consider a two-echelon supply chain that is composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. 
The retailer purchases products from the manufacturer and sells them to the end customers. 
The demand faced by the retailer is price and carbon emissions sensitive, and the decision 
variable of the retailer is retail price. The decision variables faced by the manufacturer are 
wholesale price and unit carbon emissions after green technology investment. Throughout this 
paper, we use the notations presented in Table 1.  
 
 Table 1: Notations 
Notation Descriptions 
𝑐 Manufacturer’s unit production cost. 
𝑤 Manufacturer’s unit wholesale price. 
𝑒0 Manufacturer’s initial unit carbon emissions.  
𝑒 
Manufacturer’s unit carbon emissions after green technology investment, 𝑒 ≤
𝑒0. 
𝑇 Manufacturer’s green technology investment. 
𝑡 Manufacturer’s green technology investment cost coefficient. 
𝑝 Retailer’s unit retail price. 
𝑞 Demand faced by the retailer. 
𝜋𝑚 (𝑤, 𝑒) Manufacturer’s profit. 
𝜋𝑟(𝑝) Retailer’s profit 
In addition, following assumptions are employed in this study: 
(1) 𝑇 = 𝑡(𝑒0 − 𝑒)
2. This assumption means that the manufacturer’s green technology 
investment is convexity on 𝑒, which  attributes to diminishing returns from expenditures. 
The setting is popular in the literature (Yalabik and Fairchild 2011; Swami and Shah 2013; 
Choudhary et al. 2015). 
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(2) 𝑞 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝 − 𝛾𝑒. The assumption indicates that the demand faced by the retailer is 
price and emissions sensitive (Echeverría et al. 2014; Kanchanapibul et al. 2014). 𝛼 is the 
maximal market demand (end consumer demand). 𝛽 and 𝛾 are the price sensitivity and the 
carbon emissions sensitivity. This linear demand function has been used extensively in the 
literature relating to pricing and supply chain research as an acceptable approximation of 
demand (Choudhary et al. 2015; Hovelaque and Bironneau 2015; Luo et al. 2016). We adopt 
this linear demand function because it is more analytically tractable and helps derive 
closed-form insights. 
(3) 𝑝 > 𝑤 > 𝑐 > 0. This condition states that there is a positive profit margin for the 
manufacturer to sell products to the retailer, and there is a positive profit margin for retailer to 
sell products to the end consumers. To avoid the trial result, we assume that 2𝛽𝑡 − 𝛾2 > 0. 
Base on the above assumptions, the manufacturer’s profit is 
𝜋𝑚 (𝑤, 𝑒) = 𝑤𝑞 − 𝑐𝑞 − 𝑇 
The first term is the revenue from product wholesale, the second term indicates the 
production cost, and the third term refers to the green technology investment. That is 
𝜋𝑚(𝑤, 𝑒) = (𝑤 − 𝑐)(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝 − 𝛾𝑒) − 𝑡(𝑒0 − 𝑒)
2 (1) 
We assume that the retailer’s unit marginal profit is 𝑚, then 𝑚 = 𝑝 − 𝑤. So 
𝜋𝑚(𝑤, 𝑒) = (𝑤 − 𝑐)[𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑤 + 𝑚) − 𝛾𝑒] − 𝑡(𝑒0 − 𝑒)
2 (2) 
Similarly, the retailer’s profit is 
𝜋𝑟(𝑝) = 𝑝𝑞 − 𝑤𝑞 
The first term is the revenue from product retail sales, and the second term represents the 
purchase cost. That is, 
𝜋𝑟(𝑝) = (𝑝 − 𝑤)(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝 − 𝛾𝑒) (3) 
 
4 Different power structure models 
In this section, we discuss the models with three different supply chain power structures, 
which are the manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) model, the vertical Nash (VN) model, and the 
retailer Stackelberg (RS) model respectively. 
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I. The Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) model 
In the case of a MS power structure, the manufacturer and the retailer make their decisions in 
sequence. The order of events is as follows. First, the retailer determines the retail price in 
response to the given manufacturer’s wholesale price and unit carbon emissions. Then, the 
manufacturer takes the retailer’s response function into account for the optimal wholesale 
price and unit carbon emissions in order to maximize profit. Finally, when the customer 
demand is realized, the manufacturer and the retailer gain their revenues.  
Ⅱ. The Vertical Nash (VN) model 
In the case of a VN power structure, the manufacturer and the retailer make their decisions 
simultaneously. The order of events is as follows. The manufacturer determines the response 
function of wholesale price and unit carbon emissions to maximize profit given the retailer’s 
retail price, and the retailer determines the response function of retailer price to maximize 
profit given the manufacturer’s wholesale price and unit carbon emissions. Finally, when the 
customer demand is realized, the manufacturer and the retailer gain their revenues.  
Ⅲ. The Retailer Stackelberg (RS) model 
In the case of a RS power structure, the retailer and the manufacturer make their decisions in 
the following order. First, the manufacturer determines the wholesale price and unit carbon 
emissions in response to the given retailer’s retail price. Then, the retailer takes the 
manufacturer’s response function into account for the optimal retail price to maximize profit. 
Finally, when the customer demand is realized, the manufacturer and the retailer gain their 
revenues.  
Regarding the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price (𝑤𝑖) and unit carbon emissions 
(𝑒𝑖), and the retailer’s optimal retail price (𝑝𝑖) in different power structures (𝑖 = 𝑚, 𝑛, 𝑟), the 
following lemma is obtained: 
Lemma 1 The manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price (𝒘𝒊) and unit carbon emissions 
(𝒆𝒊), and the retailer’s optimal retail price (𝒑𝒊) in three different power structures are 
summarized in Table 2. 
This lemma means that the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price and unit carbon 
emissions, and the retailer’s optimal retail price are in existent and unique in the MS, VN and 
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RS power structures. 
 
Table 2: Optimal decisions 
Model 𝒘𝒊 𝒆𝒊 𝒑𝒊 
𝑴𝑺 model 
(𝒊 = 𝒎) 
𝑐 +
4𝑡(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑐 − 𝛾𝑒0)
8𝛽𝑡 − 𝛾2
 
8𝛽𝑡𝑒0 − 𝛾(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑐)
8𝛽𝑡 − 𝛾2
 𝑐 +
6𝑡(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑐 − 𝛾𝑒0)
8𝛽𝑡 − 𝛾2
 
VN model 
(𝒊 = 𝒏) 
𝑐 +
2𝑡(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑐 − 𝛾𝑒0)
6𝛽𝑡 − 𝛾2
 
6𝛽𝑡𝑒0 − 𝛾(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑐)
6𝛽𝑡 − 𝛾2
 𝑐 +
4𝑡(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑐 − 𝛾𝑒0)
6𝛽𝑡 − 𝛾2
 
𝑹𝑺 model 
(𝒊 = 𝒓) 
𝑐 +
𝑡(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑐 − 𝛾𝑒0)
4𝛽𝑡 − 𝛾2
 
8𝛽𝑡𝑒0 − 𝛾(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑐 + 𝛾𝑒0)
2(4𝛽𝑡 − 𝛾2)
 𝑐 +
(6𝛽𝑡 − 𝛾2)(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑐 − 𝛾𝑒0)
2𝛽(4𝛽𝑡 − 𝛾2)
 
Regarding the effect of the manufacturer’s green technology investment cost coefficient 
(𝑡) on the optimal decisions for both the manufacturer and the retailer, the following corollary 
can be obtained: 
Corollary 1 Both 𝒑𝒊 and 𝒘𝒊 are decreasing functions of 𝒕, and 𝒆𝒊 is an increasing 
function of 𝒕, 𝒊 = 𝒎, 𝒏, 𝒓. 
This corollary means that in each supply chain power structure, when the manufacturer’s 
green technology investment cost coefficient (𝑡) is high, that is, the manufacturer’s green 
technology investment efficiency is low, then the manufacturer will invest less on green 
technology. As a result, the manufacturer’s optimal unit carbon emissions after green 
technology investment (𝑒𝑖) are high, which lead to less customer demand. In order to attract 
more customers, the retailer has to reduce the unit retail price (𝑝𝑖). At the same time, since 
manufacturer’s green technology investment is less, the manufacturer will set a low optimal 
wholesale price (𝑤𝑖), 𝑖 = 𝑚, 𝑛, 𝑟. 
 
5 Supply chain coordination 
In this section, an integrated supply chain is discussed as a benchmark. The firm’s profit, 
denoted as 𝜋𝐼(𝑝, 𝑒), is 
𝜋𝐼(𝑝, 𝑒) = (𝑝 − 𝑐)(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝 − 𝛾𝑒) − 𝑡(𝑒0 − 𝑒)
2 (4) 
The first term is the firm’s revenue from product sales, and the second term represents 
the green investment. As to the firm’s optimal retail price (𝑝𝐼) and optimal unit carbon 
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emissions (𝑒𝐼) in an integrated supply chain, the following lemma is obtained. 
Lemma 2 In an integrated supply chain, 𝒑𝑰 = 𝒄 +
𝟐𝒕(𝜶−𝜷𝒄−𝜸𝒆𝟎)
𝟒𝜷𝒕−𝜸𝟐
, 𝒆𝑰 =
𝟒𝜷𝒕𝒆𝟎−𝜸(𝜶−𝜷𝒄)
𝟒𝜷𝒕−𝜸𝟐
. 
This lemma means that in an integrated supply chain, there are unique optimal retail 
price and optimal unit carbon emissions.  
Now we discuss the supply chain coordination. Beside the wholesale price 𝑤, we 
assume that the retailer makes a lump-sum payment 𝐹 to the manufacturer, and we call this 
mixed contract as two-part tariff contract. Under the two-part tariff contract, the 
manufacturer’s profit, denoted as 𝜋𝑚𝑚(𝑤, 𝑒), is 
𝜋𝑚𝑚(𝑤, 𝑒) = (𝑤 − 𝑐)(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝 − 𝛾𝑒) − 𝑡(𝑒0 − 𝑒)
2 + 𝐹 (5) 
Under the two-part tariff contract, the retailer’s profit, denoted as 𝜋𝑟𝑚(𝑤, 𝑒), is 
𝜋𝑟𝑚(𝑝) = (𝑝 − 𝑤)(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝 − 𝛾𝑒) − 𝐹 (6) 
Regarding the supply chain coordination with the two-part tariff contract, the following 
proposition is obtained. 
Proposition 1 The supply chain can be coordinated with a two-part tariff contract with 
the condition satisfies 𝒘 = 𝒄 and 𝑭𝒎 =
𝟑𝟐𝜷𝟐𝒕𝟑(𝟔𝜷𝒕−𝜸𝟐)(𝜶−𝜷𝒄−𝜸𝒆𝟎)
𝟐
[(𝟖𝜷𝒕−𝜸𝟐)(𝟒𝜷𝒕−𝜸𝟐)]
𝟐  in a MS power structure, 
𝑭𝒏 =
𝟐𝜷𝟐𝒕𝟑(𝟑𝟔𝜷𝒕−𝟕𝜸𝟐)(𝜶−𝜷𝒄−𝜸𝒆𝟎)
𝟐
[(𝟔𝜷𝒕−𝜸𝟐)(𝟒𝜷𝒕−𝜸𝟐)]
𝟐  in a VN power structure, 𝑭
𝒓 =
𝒕(𝟒𝜷𝒕+𝟑𝜸𝟐)(𝜶−𝜷𝒄−𝜸𝒆𝟎)
𝟐
𝟒(𝟒𝜷𝒕−𝜸𝟐)𝟐
 in a 
RS power structure. 
This proposition indicates that a two-part tariff contract can coordinate the supply chain 
and achieve the Pareto improvement, that is, both the manufacturer and the retailer can gain 
more profit than that without the two-part tariff contract. Under this contract, the 
manufacturer undertakes the green technology investment and gains no profit from the 
product sales, but gains revenue from the lump-sum payment paid by the retailer. The amount 
of the lump-sum payment paid by the retailer is affected by the supply chain power structure. 
At the same time, the retailer obtains profit from the product sales and makes a lump-sum 
payment to the manufacturer to compensate the manufacturer’s green technology investment. 
 
6 Discussions 
In this section, we discuss the impact of power relationship on the supply chain’s decisions, 
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carbon emissions, profits and the retailer’s lump-sum payment. 
Regarding the effect of power structure on the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price 
and unit carbon emissions, and the retailer’s optimal retail price, the following proposition is 
obtained: 
Proposition 2 (𝒂)𝒘𝒎 > 𝒘𝒏 > 𝒘𝒓; (b) 𝒆𝒎 > 𝒆𝒓 > 𝒆𝒏; (c) 𝒑𝒎 > 𝒑𝒓 > 𝒑𝒏. 
This proposition indicates that the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price in a MS 
power structure is higher than that in a VN power structure. Its optimal wholesale price is the 
lowest in a RS power structure. That is, the more supply chain power that the manufacturer 
has, the higher wholesale price will be set. This means that a dominant manufacturer is more 
likely to exercise its supply chain power to gain economic benefit rather than to invest on 
green technologies to improve its efficiencies in production and carbon emissions reduction. 
However, in order to achieve the sustainability objectives, fundamentally, we need firms to 
improve their energy efficiency and decrease their unit carbon emissions through green 
technology investment. Therefore, the short term economic gains from exercising supply 
chain power may not be sustainable over the long term as their competitors can improve their 
operation efficiencies and enhance their competitive capabilities, and as result, change the 
power relationship of the supply chain. 
In addition, both the manufacturer’s optimal unit carbon emissions and the retailer’s 
optimal retail price is the lowest in a VN power structure and is the highest in a MS power 
structure. That is, the VN power structure will benefit both the environment and the customer, 
and in contrast, the MS power structure will hurt both the environment and the customer. This 
can be explained by the fact that a balanced supply chain power relationship provides a more 
competitive and fair supply chain environment. An enhanced but fairer competition will drive 
the supply chain parties to be more innovative and carbon efficient in making products and 
delivering customer services. This will certainly require the manufacturer and the retailer to 
invest more on technologies to improve their operational and carbon emission reduction 
capabilities. Such efforts will lead to improved economic and environmental performances of 
the individual members and the supply chain as a whole, and therefore make the supply chain 
more sustainable.   
Regarding the effect of the supply chain power structure on the maximum profits of the 
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manufacturer, the retailer, and the whole supply chain, the following proposition is obtained: 
Proposition 3 (a)𝝅𝒎(𝒘
𝒎, 𝒆𝒎) > 𝝅𝒎(𝒘𝒏, 𝒆𝒏) > 𝝅𝒎(𝒘𝒓, 𝒆𝒓); (b) 𝝅𝒓(𝒑𝒓) > 𝝅𝒓(𝒑𝒏) > 𝝅𝒓(𝒑𝒎); 
(c) 𝝅𝒏 > 𝝅𝒓 > 𝝅𝒎. 
From this proposition, we know that the manufacturer will gain more profit in a MS 
power structure and will generate less profit in a RS power structure. In contrast, the retailer 
will gain more profit in a RS power structure and generate less profit in a MS power structure. 
That means, the more supply chain power, the more profit that the manufacturer or the retailer 
will gain. This finding is in line with the findings of the existing literature (Zhang et al. 2012; 
Touboulic et al. 2014; Chen et al. 2016) that with an imbalanced power relationship, a 
dominant supply chain member is always in the premier position when negotiating prices, and 
is able to set a more favourable wholesale price or retail price for its own benefit. For the 
whole supply chain, a more balanced power relationship between the manufacturer and the 
retailer will lead to higher profit. Recalling the proposition 2, we found that the VN power 
structure will benefit the environment, the end consumers and the whole supply chain. 
Regarding the effect of power structure on the retailer’s lump-sum payment (𝐹), the 
following proposition is obtained. 
Proposition 4 𝑭𝒎 > 𝑭𝒏 > 𝑭𝒓. 
From this proposition, we know that the supply chain power relationship plays an 
important role in the retailer’s lump-sum payment. If it is a MS power structure, a higher 
lump-sum payment will be paid to the manufacturer. In contrast, if it is a RS power structure, 
a lower lump-sum payment will be paid to the manufacturer. Again, similar to the explanation 
made earlier, more supply chain power will give the manufacturer or the retailer an advantage 
when negotiating the lump-sum payment with their supply chain count parties.    
 
7 Case study 
A case study of the food supply chain is presented here to illustrate how our analytical 
modelling results can be applied to the supply chains in the real world. Food provision is an 
essential part of our society. Whereas the production and distribution of food products become 
more efficient in many aspects, managing the sustainability of the food supply chain remains 
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to be urgent than ever as the industry consumes a large amount of natural resources and faces 
ever increasing demand (Li et al. 2014). In addition, food supply chains are often key 
contributors of greenhouse gas emissions. For instance, in the UK, the food industry 
contributes about 40% of the national total emissions (Government Office for Science, 2011). 
Therefore, it is critical for food supply chains to improve the sustainability in order to regain 
and retain consumer trust and meet the future demand.  
   Furthermore, all three supply chain power relationships discussed in this research are 
common in the food supply chain. For instance, in many developed countries, consumers 
purchase their food products from grocery supermarkets. In fact, supermarkets are often the 
dominant force or supply chain leader (the retailer Stackelberg game). They are often 
described as the chain captain, who has the power to impose through strategic and operational 
decisions and drive the sustainability agenda. In the grocery food supply chain, there are also 
powerful and resourceful multinational food manufacturers e.g. Nestle and Danone. Therefore, 
there is often a balanced supply chain power relationship (the vertical Nash game) between 
the big food manufacturers and supermarkets. In addition, there is a different supply chain 
power relationship (the manufacturer Stackelberg game) when the powerful food 
manufacturers sell their products through smaller scale independent food retailers, which is 
also common in both developed and developing countries. In the United Kingdom, the 
grocery supply chain has received much attention from the general public and policy makers 
on its sustainability performance due to some recent high profile events such as the Horse 
Meat Scandal and the price dispute between diary producers and supermarket chains. While 
the imbalanced supply chain power relationship may contribute these incidents, the price 
dispute between TESCO (the UK largest supermarket) and Unilever (the largest food 
manufacturer) has again attracted wide media coverage.    
    In the following section, numerical analysis is provided to examine the impact of various 
factors on firms’ operations decisions and economic and environmental performances. More 
specifically, we discuss the effect of manufacturer’s green technology investment cost 
coefficient (𝑡 ) and carbon emissions sensitivity ( 𝛾 ) on maximum profits of both the 
manufacturer and the retailer. There are hundreds types of food products involved in the daily 
transition in the grocery food supply chain. For the demonstration purpose, we only choose 
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one product item in the illustrative example, in which, we specify that the food 
manufacturer’s unit production cost (𝑐) for this item as £1, the manufacturer’s initial unit 
carbon emissions (𝑒0) as 20, the maximal market demand (𝛼) as 100, and the price sensitivity 
(𝛽) as 3. 
 
7.1 Effects of manufacturer’s green technology investment cost coefficient (𝒕) 
First, a numerical example is presented to illustrate the effects of manufacturer’s green 
technology investment cost coefficient (𝑡) on the maximum profits of both the manufacturer 
and the retailer. We assume that the carbon emissions sensitivity (𝛾) is 1. However, we will 
also analyse the effect of carbon emissions sensitivity with a different set of value for 𝛾 in 
the next section. The corresponding results are shown in Figure 1. 
     
  
(a)                                    (b) 
Figure 1: Effects of 𝒕 on firms’ economic performance 
From Figure 1, we observe that manufacturer’s green technology investment cost 
coefficient (𝑡) does affect the maximum profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer in 
each power structure. As the manufacturer’s green technology investment cost coefficient (𝑡) 
increases, the manufacturer has to invest more to achieve the carbon emissions reduction. 
Then the manufacturer’s maximum profit decreases in each power structure. At the same time, 
in order to reduce the burden of green technology investment cost, the manufacturer wants to 
share the green technology investment cost with the retailer by adjusting the wholesale price, 
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then the retailer’s maximum profit will also decrease. So, when the manufacturer’s green 
technology investment cost coefficient (𝑡) increases, both the manufacturer’s maximum profit 
(Figure 1a) and the retailer’s maximum profit (Figure 1b) decrease in all three power 
structures. The above analysis indicates that in order to achieve the financial benefit (e.g. 
making more profit), supply chain members should try to gain more market power through 
increasing the economic scale of their businesses, and alternatively improve the efficiency of 
green technology investment through developing their technological and operational 
capabilities.   
 
7.2 Effects of carbon emissions sensitivity (𝜸) 
Now, we examine the effect of carbon emissions sensitivity (𝛾) on the manufacturer’s 
maximum profits and total carbon emissions ( 𝑞𝑖𝑒𝑖, 𝑖 = 𝑚, 𝑛, 𝑟 ). We specify that the 
manufacturer’s green technology investment cost coefficient (𝑡) as 0.1. The corresponding 
results are shown in Figure 2. 
  
(a)                                      (b) 
Figure 2: Effects of 𝜸 on the manufacturer’s economic and environmental performance 
From Figure 2(a), we observe that carbon emissions sensitivity (𝛾) does affect the 
maximum profits and total carbon emissions of the manufacturer in each power structure. As 
the carbon emissions sensitivity (𝛾) increases, the manufacturer has to invest more to reduce 
his carbon emissions. Then the manufacturer’s maximum profit decreases in each power 
structure. From Figure 2(b), we observe that carbon emissions sensitivity (𝛾) does affect the 
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manufacturer’s total carbon emissions in each power structure. As the carbon emissions 
sensitivity (𝛾) increases, that is, the customers demand is more sensitive on the carbon 
emissions sensitivity (𝛾), it will force firms to reduce carbon emissions in order to win 
customer orders. However, it requires more investment on green technology. Therefore, it is 
clear from Figure 2 that more sensitive customer demand toward carbon emission will, on the 
one hand, improve firms’ environmental performance, and on the other hand, decrease their 
economic performance because of the additional cost involved in carbon emissions reduction. 
Firms have to deal with the dilemma between the economic and environmental objectives of 
the sustainability. As the evolving public attitude towards the environmental protection, in 
order to improve their long term competitive capabilities, it will be beneficial for firms to 
sacrifice the short term economic performance and reduce their carbon emissions through 
green technology investment. In this connection, the Government may be able to introduce 
relevant policy to subsidise or to help the industry, especially small and medium sized 
companies, to overcome this short term pain.   
 
8 Conclusion and future research 
Sustainability agenda has become increasingly important in ensuring sound business practices 
in everyday life. In this paper, a two-echelon sustainable supply chain is considered consisting 
of a manufacturer and a retailer. Based on game models, we derive the manufacturer’s optimal 
wholesale price and unit carbon emissions, and the retailer’s optimal retail price under three 
supply chain power structures. In addition, we design a two-part tariff contract that takes into 
account the relevant parameters of prices and green technology investment. Our analysis 
show that such a contract can coordinate the sustainable supply chain under different power 
structures and achieve the Pareto improvement. Finally, we discuss the effect of power 
relationship on the supply chain’s decisions, coordination contracts, and sustainability 
performances. The main findings are as following: 
    Economically, the more power a retailer or a manufacturer has over its supply chain 
partner, the more economic benefit can be gained for the powerful supply chain member. The 
increased profit is mainly contributed by a higher retail price or wholesale price they can 
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charge to their customers or a higher lump-sum payment received from its supply chain 
partner. From the whole supply chain point of view, a more balanced power between the 
manufacturer and the retailer, i.e., the VN model in this study, will generate the best economic 
performance. Interestingly, there is a dilemma between maximizing individual firms’ profits 
and the whole supply chain’s profits. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that the 
business competition have already evolved from the competition of individual companies to 
the competition of supply chains. In order to achieve an economically sustainable supply 
chain, even for solely profit pursuers, it is essential to improve the economic performance of 
the whole supply chain to ensure a long term success.         
Environmentally, the VN model also produces the best performance as it generates the 
lowest optimal unit carbon emissions. In contrast, the MS model produces the worst 
environmental performance as it generates the highest optimal unit carbon emissions. This can 
be explained by the fact that in the Manufacturer or Retailer Stackelberg models, the 
manufacturer or the retailer often exploits her power over her dependent supply chain 
members to gain economic benefit rather than improve their own operations efficiency or 
environmental capabilities to gain market competitiveness. In contrast, there is more supply 
chain competition in the VN model, which drives the manufacturer and the retailer to invest 
on technologies to improve their operations and environmental capabilities in order to gain 
market competitiveness. 
Socially, a balanced supply chain relationship performs best as compared to the 
Stackelberg models. This is mainly reflected in two aspects. First, from the general public 
perspective, while generating the lowest optimal unit carbon emissions, the VN model also 
achieves the lowest optimal retail price. It means that if there is a balanced supply chain 
power, the environmentally friendly products are more affordable to the end consumers and 
therefore can be accessed and consumed by a wider population. Second, from the whole 
supply chain point of view, a balanced power also generates more profits as compared to the 
power imbalanced supply chains. Supply chain partners can therefore share the increased 
profits between them through a two-part tariff contract and gain mutual benefits. 
Consequently, they can either pay bonuses or dividends to existing staff to improve the 
welfare of existing staff or re-invest gained profit to recruit new staff.    
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Our findings provide many interesting managerial and policy implications. First, we 
derived the optimal wholesale price, retail price, unit carbon emissions and lump-sum 
payment under three different supply chain power structures, which will be beneficial to 
manufacturers and retailers in different supply chain environments to make optimal 
operational decisions to improve their profits. Second, we discuss the implications of the 
supply chain power relationship to the sustainability performances from the perspectives of 
economics, environment and society, which enables manufacturers and retailers to make 
strategic decisions toward sustainable supply chain management. For instance, in order to 
achieve the sustainability goals, dominant members may not exploit their power over 
dependent supply chain count parties but rather treat them like strategic partners. A similar 
view is shared by the work of Pagell et al. (2010). It is valuable for business leaders and 
policy makers to create an effective supply chain environment that can promote sustainable 
development across different industrial sectors.  
Indeed, we see this paper as an early attempt to understand key decisions of coordinating 
sustainable supply chains under different power structures and their impact on the 
sustainability performances. Similar to other previous work published in the literature, the 
present model also has its own limitations, which imply fruitful directions for future research. 
For example, a linear additive deterministic demand function is adopted in the paper. 
Although this simple form of demand function has the advantages of being analytically more 
tractable and is widely applied in similar studies (Yalabik and Fairchild 2011; Choudhary et al. 
2015, He et al. 2015, Hovelaque and Bironneau 2015; Luo et al. 2016), using deterministic 
models does not consider the cost associated with demand uncertainty. One future extension is 
to investigate the research problem using other forms of demand function including stochastic 
models to explore how different demand functions might influence the result. Furthermore, 
although social implications of a sustainable supply chain are discussed from the view of 
consumer affordability of low carbon emissions product and the mutual benefits of supply 
chain parties, we have to acknowledge that the social aspect of the sustainability is not 
specifically quantified as compared to the economic and environmental aspects. It will be an 
interesting future research extension to incorporate the key indicator that specifically 
measures the social performance in the analytical model. Finally, our model assumed the 
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two-echelon supply chain consisting of a retailer and a manufacturer. In the real world, supply 
chains are often much more complicated than this simple form of supply chain structure. 
Despite the value and contribution discussed above, the research would generate more 
interesting insights and provide better decisions support if other supply chain parties such as 
consumers and logistics service providers can be incorporated in the modelling. It would also 
be interesting to consider multi-retailers and/or multi-manufacturers and analyse the effect of 
vertical and horizontal power relationships on supply chain decisions and sustainability 
performances.  
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1 
I. The Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) model 
From (3), we get 
𝑑𝜋𝑟(𝑝)
𝑑𝑝
= 𝛼 − 2𝛽𝑝 + 𝛽𝑤 − 𝛾𝑒 and 
𝑑2𝜋𝑟(𝑝)
𝑑𝑝2
= −2𝛽 < 0, that is, 𝜋𝑟(𝑝) is 
concave in 𝑝. Let 
𝑑𝜋𝑟(𝑝)
𝑑𝑝
= 0, we get 𝑝 =
𝛼+𝛽𝑤−𝛾𝑒
2𝛽
. Replace 𝑝 =
𝛼+𝛽𝑤−𝛾𝑒
2𝛽
 to (1), we get 
𝜋𝑚(𝑤, 𝑒) =
1
2
(𝑤 − 𝑐)(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑤 − 𝛾𝑒) − 𝑡(𝑒0 − 𝑒)
2 . Let 
𝜕𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑤
=
𝜕𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑒
= 0，we get 
𝑤𝑚 = 𝑐 +
4𝑡(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
8𝛽𝑡−𝛾2
 and 𝑒𝑚 =
8𝛽𝑡𝑒0−𝛾(𝛼−𝛽𝑐)
8𝛽𝑡−𝛾2
. Recall 𝑝 > 𝑤 > 𝑐  and 𝑒 ≤ 𝑒0 , we get 
𝑞 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝 − 𝛾𝑒 > 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑐 − 𝛾𝑒0 > 0 . Since 
𝜕𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑤
=
1
2
(𝛼 + 𝛽𝑐 − 2𝛽𝑤 − 𝛾𝑒) , 
𝜕𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑒
= 2𝑡(𝑒0 − 𝑒) −
1
2
𝛾(𝑤 − 𝑐) , 
𝜕2𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑤2
= −𝛽 < 0 , 
𝜕2𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑒2
= −2𝑡  and 
𝜕2𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑤𝜕𝑒
=
𝜕2𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑒𝜕𝑤
= −
𝛾
2
, then |
𝜕2𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑤2
𝜕2𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑤𝜕𝑒
𝜕2𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑒𝜕𝑤
𝜕2𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑒2
| =
8𝛽𝑡−𝛾2
4
> 0, that is, 𝜋𝑚(𝑤, 𝑒) is 
joint concave in 𝑤  and 𝑒 . Replace 𝑤𝑚  and 𝑒𝑚  to 𝑝 =
𝛼+𝛽𝑤−𝛾𝑒
2𝛽
, we get 𝑝𝑚 = 𝑐 +
6𝑡(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
8𝛽𝑡−𝛾2
.  
Ⅱ. The Vertical Nash (VN) model 
From (2), we get 
𝜕𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑤
= 𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑤 − 𝑐) − 𝛽(𝑤 + 𝑚) − 𝛾𝑒 , 
𝜕𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑒
= 2𝑡(𝑒0 − 𝑒) −
𝛾(𝑤 − 𝑐) . From 
𝜕𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑤
=
𝜕𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑒
= 0 , we get 𝑤𝑛 = 𝑐 +
2𝑡(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2
, 𝑒𝑛 =
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6𝛽𝑡𝑒0−𝛾(𝛼−𝛽𝑐)
6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2
. Recall 𝑝 > 𝑤 > 𝑐 and 𝑒 ≤ 𝑒0, we get 𝑞 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝 − 𝛾𝑒 > 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑐 − 𝛾𝑒0 >
0 . Since 
𝜕2𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑤2
= −2𝛽 < 0 , 
𝜕2𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑒2
= −2𝑡  and 
𝜕2𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑤𝜕𝑒
=
𝜕2𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑒𝜕𝑤
= −𝛾 , then 
|
𝜕2𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑤2
𝜕2𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑤𝜕𝑒
𝜕2𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑒𝜕𝑤
𝜕2𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑒2
| = 4𝛽𝑡 − 𝛾2 > 0, that is, 𝜋𝑚(𝑤, 𝑒) is a joint concave in 𝑤 and 𝑒. 
Similarly, from (3), we get 
𝑑𝜋𝑟(𝑝)
𝑑𝑝
= 𝛼 − 2𝛽𝑝 + 𝛽𝑤 − 𝛾𝑒 and 
𝑑2𝜋𝑟(𝑝)
𝑑𝑝2
= −2𝛽 < 0, that is, 
𝜋𝑟(𝑝) is concave in 𝑝. From 
𝑑𝜋𝑟(𝑝)
𝑑𝑝
= 0, we get 𝑝𝑛 = 𝑐 +
4𝑡(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2
.  
Ⅲ. The Retailer Stackelberg (RS) model 
From (2), we get 
𝜕𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑤
= 𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑤 − 𝑐) − 𝛽(𝑤 + 𝑚) − 𝛾𝑒 , 
𝜕𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑒
= 2𝑡(𝑒0 − 𝑒) −
𝛾(𝑤 − 𝑐) , From 
𝜕𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑤
=
𝜕𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑒
= 0 , we get 𝑤 = 𝑐 +
2𝑡(𝛼−𝛽𝑝−𝛾𝑒0)
2𝛽𝑡−𝛾2
 and 𝑒 =
2𝛽𝑡𝑒0−(𝛼−𝛽𝑝)𝛾
2𝛽𝑡−𝛾2
. Replace 𝑤 = 𝑐 +
2𝑡(𝛼−𝛽𝑝−𝛾𝑒0)
2𝛽𝑡−𝛾2
 and 𝑒 =
2𝛽𝑡𝑒0−(𝛼−𝛽𝑝)𝛾
2𝛽𝑡−𝛾2
 to (3), we get 
𝜋𝑟(𝑝) = [𝑝 − 𝑐 −
2𝑡(𝛼−𝛽𝑝−𝛾𝑒0)
2𝛽𝑡−𝛾2
] [𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝 − 𝛾
2𝛽𝑡𝑒0−(𝛼−𝛽𝑝)𝛾
2𝛽𝑡−𝛾2
] , then we get 
𝑑𝜋𝑟(𝑝)
𝑑𝑝
=
2𝛽𝑡[2𝛽𝑡(3𝛼+𝛽𝑐−4𝛽𝑝−3𝛾𝑒0)−𝛾
2(𝛼+𝛽𝑐−2𝛽𝑝−𝛾𝑒0)]
(2𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)2
 and 
𝑑2𝜋𝑟(𝑝)
𝑑𝑝2
=
−4𝛽2𝑡(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)
(2𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)2
< 0 , that is, 𝜋𝑟(𝑝) 
is concave in 𝑝. Let 
𝑑𝜋𝑟(𝑝)
𝑑𝑝
= 0, we get 𝑝𝑟 = 𝑐 +
(6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2𝛽(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)
. Replace 𝑝𝑟 to 𝑤 =
𝑐 +
2𝑡(𝛼−𝛽𝑝−𝛾𝑒0)
2𝛽𝑡−𝛾2
 and 𝑒 =
2𝛽𝑡𝑒0−(𝛼−𝛽𝑝)𝛾
2𝛽𝑡−𝛾2
, we get 𝑤𝑟 = 𝑐 +
𝑡(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2
 and 𝑒𝑟 =
8𝛽𝑡𝑒0−𝛾(𝛼−𝛽𝑐+𝛾𝑒0)
2(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)
. Recall 𝑝 > 𝑤 > 𝑐  and 𝑒 ≤ 𝑒0 , we get 𝑞 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝 − 𝛾𝑒 > 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑐 −
𝛾𝑒0 > 0 . Since 
𝜕2𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑤2
= −2𝛽 < 0 , 
𝜕2𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑒2
= −2𝑡  and 
𝜕2𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑤𝜕𝑒
=
𝜕2𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑒𝜕𝑤
= −𝛾 , 
then |
𝜕2𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑤2
𝜕2𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑤𝜕𝑒
𝜕2𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑒𝜕𝑤
𝜕2𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒)
𝜕𝑒2
| = 4𝛽𝑡 − 𝛾2 > 0, that is, 𝜋𝑚(𝑤, 𝑒) is a joint concave in 𝑤 and 
𝑒. Hence, the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price and unit carbon emissions, and the 
retailer’s optimal retail price are existent and unique in the MS, VN and RS power structures. 
This completes the proof. 
 
Proof of Corollary 1 
𝑑𝑤𝑚
𝑑𝑡
= −
4𝑟2(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
(8𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)2
< 0, 
𝑑𝑤𝑛
𝑑𝑡
= −
2𝑟2(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
(6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)2
< 0 and 
𝑑𝑤𝑟
𝑑𝑡
= −
𝑟2(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)2
< 0, that 
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is, 𝑤𝑖  is a decreasing function of 𝑡 , 𝑖 = 𝑚, 𝑛, 𝑟 . 
𝑑𝑒𝑚
𝑑𝑡
=
8𝛽𝛾(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
(8𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)2
> 0 , 
𝑑𝑒𝑛
𝑑𝑡
=
6𝛽𝛾(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
(6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)2
> 0 and 
𝑑𝑒𝑟
𝑑𝑡
=
8𝛽𝛾(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
(8𝛽𝑡−2𝛾2)2
> 0, that is, 𝑒𝑖 is an increasing function of 𝑡, 
𝑖 = 𝑚, 𝑛, 𝑟 . 
𝑑𝑝𝑚
𝑑𝑡
= −
6𝑟2(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
(8𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)2
< 0 , 
𝑑𝑝𝑛
𝑑𝑡
= −
4𝑟2(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
(6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)2
< 0  and 
𝑑𝑝𝑟
𝑑𝑡
=
−
𝑟2(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)2
< 0, that is, 𝑝𝑖 is a decreasing function of 𝑡, 𝑖 = 𝑚, 𝑛, 𝑟. So, both 𝑝𝑖 and 
𝑤𝑖 are decreasing functions of 𝑡, and 𝑒𝑖 is an increasing function of 𝑡, 𝑖 = 𝑚, 𝑛, 𝑟. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2 
From (4), we get 
𝜕𝜋𝐼(𝑝,𝑒)
𝜕𝑝
= 𝛼 − 2𝛽𝑝 + 𝛽𝑐 − 𝛾𝑒 , 
𝜕𝜋𝐼(𝑝,𝑒)
𝜕𝑒
= 2(𝑒0 − 𝑒)𝑡 − (𝑝 − 𝑐)𝛾 . From 
𝜕𝜋𝐼(𝑝,𝑒)
𝜕𝑝
=
𝜕𝜋𝐼(𝑝,𝑒)
𝜕𝑒
= 0 , we get 𝑝𝐼 = 𝑐 +
2𝑡(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2
 and 𝑒𝐼 =
4𝛽𝑡𝑒0−𝛾(𝛼−𝛽𝑐)
4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2
. Recall 𝑝 >
𝑤 > 𝑐  and 𝑒 ≤ 𝑒0 , we get 𝑞 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝 − 𝛾𝑒 > 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑐 − 𝛾𝑒0 > 0 . Since 
𝜕2𝜋𝐼(𝑝,𝑒)
𝜕𝑝2
=
−2𝛽 < 0 , 
𝜕2𝜋𝐼(𝑝,𝑒)
𝜕𝑒2
= −2𝑡  and 
𝜕2𝜋𝐼(𝑝,𝑒)
𝜕𝑝𝜕𝑒
=
𝜕2𝜋𝐼(𝑝,𝑒)
𝜕𝑒𝜕𝑝
= −𝛾 , then |
𝜕2𝜋𝐼(𝑝,𝑒)
𝜕𝑝2
𝜕2𝜋𝐼(𝑝,𝑒)
𝜕𝑝𝜕𝑒
𝜕2𝜋𝐼(𝑝,𝑒)
𝜕𝑒𝜕𝑝
𝜕2𝜋𝐼(𝑝,𝑒)
𝜕𝑒2
| =
4𝛽𝑡 − 𝛾2 > 0, that is, 𝜋𝐼(𝑝, 𝑒) is joint concave in 𝑝 and 𝑒. This completes the proof. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
From (6), we get 
𝑑𝜋𝑟𝑚(𝑝)
𝑑𝑝
= 𝛼 − 2𝛽𝑝 + 𝛽𝑤 − 𝛾𝑒 and 
𝑑2𝜋𝑟𝑚(𝑝)
𝑑𝑝2
= −2𝛽 < 0, that is, 𝜋𝑟𝑚(𝑝) 
is concave in 𝑝 . Let 
𝑑𝜋𝑟𝑚(𝑝)
𝑑𝑝
= 0 , we get 𝛼 − 2𝛽𝑝 + 𝛽𝑤 − 𝛾𝑒 = 0 = 0 . In order to 
coordinate the supply chain, replace 𝑝 = 𝑝𝐼 and 𝑒 = 𝑒𝐼 to aforementioned equation, we get 
𝛽(𝑤 − 𝑐) = 0, then 𝑤 = 𝑐. 
In a MS power structure, the manufacturer is the market leader and gain the extra profit 
from the supply chain coordination, that is, 𝜋𝑟𝑚(𝑝
𝐼) − 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑚) =
32𝛽2𝑡3(6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
[(8𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)]2
− 𝐹 = 0 , then we get 𝐹𝑚 =
32𝛽2𝑡3(6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
[(8𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)]2
. For the 
manufacturer, 𝜋𝑚𝑚(𝑝
𝐼 , 𝑒𝐼) − 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑚, 𝑒𝑚) = 𝐹𝑚 −
16𝛽2𝑡3(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
(8𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)2
> 0 . So, in a MS 
power structure, 𝑤 = 𝑐 and 𝐹𝑚 =
32𝛽2𝑡3(6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
[(8𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)]2
 is a coordination and Pareto 
contract for the supply chain. 
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In a VN power structure, the retailer and the manufacturer have same supply chain power 
and they gain half the extra profit from the supply chain coordination, that is, 𝜋𝑟𝑚(𝑝
𝐼) −
𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑛) = 𝜋𝑟𝑚(𝑝
𝐼 , 𝑒𝐼) − 𝜋𝑟(𝑤
𝑛, 𝑒𝑛) . Since 𝜋𝑟𝑚(𝑝
𝐼) − 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑛) =
16𝛽2𝑡3(5𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
[(6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)]2
− 𝐹  and 𝜋𝑟𝑚(𝑝
𝐼 , 𝑒𝐼) − 𝜋𝑟(𝑤
𝑛, 𝑒𝑛) = 𝐹 −
4𝛽2𝑡3(16𝛽𝑡−3𝛾2)(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
[(6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)]2
, then 𝐹𝑛 =
2𝛽2𝑡3(36𝛽𝑡−7𝛾2)(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
[(6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)]2
. So, in a VN power 
structure, 𝑤 = 𝑐 and 𝐹𝑛 =
2𝛽2𝑡3(36𝛽𝑡−7𝛾2)(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
[(6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)]2
 is a coordination and Pareto contract 
for the supply chain. 
In a RS power structure, the retailer is the market leader and gain the extra profit from 
the supply chain coordination, that is, 𝜋𝑚𝑚(𝑝
𝐼 , 𝑒𝐼) − 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑟 , 𝑒𝑟) = 𝐹 −
𝑡(4𝛽𝑡+3𝛾2)(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
4(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)2
= 0 , then we get 𝐹𝑟 =
𝑡(4𝛽𝑡+3𝛾2)(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
4(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)2
. For the retailer, 
𝜋𝑟𝑚(𝑝
𝐼) − 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑟) =
𝑡(4𝛽𝑡+𝛾2)(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
2(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)2
− 𝐹𝑟 > 0. So, in a RS power structure, 𝑤 = 𝑐 and 
𝐹𝑟 =
𝑡(4𝛽𝑡+3𝛾2)(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
4(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)2
 is a coordination and Pareto contract for the supply chain. 
So, the supply chain can be coordinated with the two-part tariff contract, and the 
condition satisfies 𝑤 = 𝑐  and 𝐹𝑚 =
32𝛽2𝑡3(6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
[(8𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)]2
 in a MS power structure, 
𝐹𝑛 =
2𝛽2𝑡3(36𝛽𝑡−7𝛾2)(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
[(6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)]2
 in a VN power structure, 𝐹𝑟 =
𝑡(4𝛽𝑡+3𝛾2)(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
4(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)2
 in a 
RS power structure. This completes the proof. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
(a) From lemma 1, we get 𝑤𝑚 − 𝑤𝑛 =
2𝑡(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾
2)
(8𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)
> 0 , that is, 𝑤𝑚 > 𝑤𝑛 . 
Similarly, from lemma 1, we get 𝑤𝑛 − 𝑤𝑟 =
𝑡(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)(2𝛽𝑡−𝛾
2)
(6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)
> 0, that is, 𝑤𝑛 > 𝑤𝑟. So, 
𝑤𝑚 > 𝑤𝑛 > 𝑤𝑟. 
(b) From lemma 1, we get 𝑒𝑚 − 𝑒𝑟 =
𝛾3(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2(8𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)
> 0, that is, 𝑒𝑚 > 𝑒𝑟. Similarly, 
from lemma 1, we get 𝑒𝑛 − 𝑒𝑟 = −
𝛾(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)(2𝛽𝑡−𝛾
2)
2(6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)
< 0, that is, 𝑒𝑟 > 𝑒𝑛. So, 𝑒𝑚 >
𝑒𝑟 > 𝑒𝑛. 
(c) From lemma 1, we get 𝑝𝑚 − 𝑝𝑟 =
𝛾2(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)(2𝛽𝑡−𝛾
2)
2𝛽(8𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)
> 0 , that is, 𝑝𝑚 > 𝑝𝑟 . 
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Similarly, from lemma 1, we get 𝑝𝑛 − 𝑝𝑟 = −
(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)(2𝛽𝑡−𝛾
2)
2
2𝛽(6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)
< 0, that is, 𝑝𝑟 > 𝑝𝑛. So, 
𝑝𝑚 > 𝑝𝑟 > 𝑝𝑛. This completes the proof. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
(a) From lemma 1 and (1), we get the manufacturer’s maximum profit in a MS power 
structure is 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑚, 𝑒𝑚) =
𝑡(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
8𝛽𝑡−𝛾2
, the manufacturer’s maximum profit in a VN power 
structure is 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛, 𝑒𝑛) =
𝑡(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)
(6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)2
, and the manufacturer’s maximum profit in a 
RS power structure is 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑟 , 𝑒𝑟) =
𝑡(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
4(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)
. Then 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑚, 𝑒𝑚) − 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛, 𝑒𝑛) =
4𝛽2𝑡3(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
(8𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)2
> 0 , then 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑚, 𝑒𝑚) − 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛, 𝑒𝑛) > 0 , that is, 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑚, 𝑒𝑚) >
𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛, 𝑒𝑛) . Similarly, 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛, 𝑒𝑛) − 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑟 , 𝑒𝑟) =
𝑡(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2(14𝛽𝑡−3𝛾2)(2𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)
4(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)2
> 0 , 
that is, 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛, 𝑒𝑛) > 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑟 , 𝑒𝑟). So, 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑚, 𝑒𝑚) > 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛, 𝑒𝑛) > 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑟 , 𝑒𝑟). 
(b) From lemma 1 and (3), we get the retailer’s maximum profit in a MS power structure 
is 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑚) =
4𝛽𝑡2(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
(8𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)2
, the retailer’s maximum profit in a VN power structure is 
𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑛) =
4𝛽𝑡2(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
(6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)2
, and the retailer’s maximum profit in a RS power structure is 
𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑟) =
𝑡(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
2(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)
. Then 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑚) − 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑛) = −
16𝛽2𝑡3(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2(7𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)
[(8𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)]2
< 0, that is, 
𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑛) > 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑚) . Similarly, 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑛) −  𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑟) = −
𝑡(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2(2𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)
2
2(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)2
< 0 , that is, 
𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑟) > 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑛). So, 𝜋𝑟
𝑟(𝑝𝑟) > 𝜋𝑟
𝑛(𝑝𝑛) > 𝜋𝑟
𝑚(𝑝𝑚). 
(c) From lemma 1, (1) and (3), we get the supply chain’s maximum profit in a MS power 
structure is 𝜋𝑚 =
𝑡(12𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
(8𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)2
, the supply chain’s maximum profit in a VN power 
structure is 𝜋𝑛 =
𝑡(8𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
(6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)2
, and the supply chain’s maximum profit in a RS power 
structure is 𝜋𝑟 =
3𝑡(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
4(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)
. Then 𝜋𝑚 − 𝜋𝑟 = −
𝑡𝛾2(16𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
4(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(8𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)2
< 0 , that is, 
𝜋𝑟 > 𝜋𝑚. Similarly, we get 𝜋𝑛 − 𝜋𝑟 =
𝑡(10𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(2𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
4(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)2
> 0, that is, 𝜋𝑛 > 𝜋𝑟. 
So, 𝜋𝑛 > 𝜋𝑟 > 𝜋𝑚. This completes the proof. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
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From proposition 3, we get that 𝐹𝑚 − 𝐹𝑛 =
2𝛽2𝑡3[104𝛽𝑡(2𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)+80𝛽2𝑡2+9𝛾4](𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)[(8𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)]2
> 0, 
that is, 𝐹𝑚 > 𝐹𝑛 . Similarly, from proposition 3, we get that 𝐹𝑛 − 𝐹𝑟 =
𝑡[(18𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(2𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)+2𝛾4](𝛼−𝛽𝑐−𝛾𝑒0)
2
4(4𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)(6𝛽𝑡−𝛾2)2
> 0 , that is, 𝐹𝑛 > 𝐹𝑟 . So, 𝐹𝑚 > 𝐹𝑛 > 𝐹𝑟 . This 
completes the proof. 
